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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
VI Ciar , A. L~w
Extradition
In People ex rel. Matochik v. Baker,1 the Court of Appeals re-
solved a conflict existing in the lower courts, by holding that a
state can extradite on less exacting terms than those prescribed
by the Federal Extradition Statute.2 The federal statute recites
in part that a state shall extradite where the executive authority
requesting extradition produces a copy of an indictment. This is
different from the New York statute3 which provides that the
Governor may extradite if the moving papers are "accompanied
by a copy of an indictment or by an information supported by
affidavit."
In the instant case the Vermont Governor's requisition for
extradition included a certified information 4 and five affidavits.
The relator, arrested under a warrant of extradition, issued in
New York in compliance with Vermont's requisition, attacked
the validity of the extradition, by questioning whether a writ of
extradition may be granted on an information, when the language
of the federal statute calls for an indictment.
The decisions in the Appellate Division have been in conflict.
A. case prior to the enactment of the present New York statute
held that an extraditon proceeding may be based on an informa-
tion, on the theory that the information is sufficient compliance
with the federal statute, where the law of the demanding state
authorizes prosecution by that method.6 However, another depart-
ment, subsequent to the present statute, held that an information
can not support extradition, on the theory that the federal statute
was "exclusive and controlling" insofar "as any inconsistency
exists" between it and the New York statute.7
The Court of Appeals in the instant case predicated its de-
cision on the theory expressed by Judge Halpern in People ex rel.
Hollander v. Britt." The court followed the line of reasoning that
1. 306 N. Y. 32, 114 N. E. 2d 194 (1953).
2. 18 U. S. C. § 3182 (1951).
3. CODE Cam!. PROC. § 830.
4. Vermont statute prescribes defendant may be prosecuted for crime charged, by
an information.
5. See note 3 supra; New York adopted the UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION
Acr in 1936.
6. People ex rel. Mac Sherry v. Enriqht, 112 Misc. 568, 184 N. Y. Supp. 248
(Sup. Ct. 1920), affd, 196 App. Div. 964, 188 N. Y. Supp. 945 (1st Dep't 1921).
7. People ex rel Lipskitz v. Bessenger, 273 App. Div. 19, 75 N. Y. S. 2d 392 (2nd
Dep't 1947).
8. 195 Misc. 722, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 662 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd, 276 App. Div. 815, 93
N. Y. S. 2d 704 (4th Dep't 1949).
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there is no constitutional prohibition against a state enacting
legislation to supplement the federal statute by permitting ex-
tradition on less exacting terms. Also, the federal statute pre-
scribes only those terms upon which a state shall extradite, but
does not prohibit a state from voluntarily providing to extradite
under other circumstances less exacting.
The fact that an overwhelming majority of the states have
adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, which allows ex-
tradition on an information supported by affidavit, is evilence
that it is necessary for the states to supplement the federal
statute in order to achieve a more cooperative effort in the pre-
vention of crime and in the enforcement of their respective
criminal laws.
Indictment
It has been a long standing practice to include in the indict-
ment, allegations charging defendant as a prior offender and re-
ceiving proof thereof at the trial, in order that the judge-can
impose proper punishment for a multiple offender.9 This ob-
viously unfair practice will be allowed to continue unless abolished
by legislative action. This is stated by the decision in People v.
De Santis' where such prejudicial practice was held not to be
reversible error.
From this decision it must also follow that § 1943 of the Penal
Law passed in 1926, authorizing the District Attorney to proceed
by information after the conviction or sentence, to secure heavier
punishment, did not abolish the old method, but supplemented it.
In a dissenting opinion Julge Fuld reasoned that such a
patently unfair practice was upheld prior to passage of § 1943
of the Penal Law, because it was the only method by which a
heavier penalty provided for recidivists could be imposed. The
new method is fairer, accomplishes substantially the same purpose,
and should be used exclusively.
There was nolegal barrier for the'court to hurdle in eliminat-
ing this prejudicial practice, for no square holding on the intepre-
tation of § 1943 had been previously made, although dictum in one
case11 stated that the "old practice is still permissible although
no longer necessary." However, the legislative intent in passing
this section would seem to sustain the majority, since the statute
9. People v. Sickles, 156 N. Y. 541, 51 N. E. 288 (1898) ; Johnson v. People, 55
N. Y. 512 (1874).
10. 305 N. Y. 44, 110 N. E. 2d 549 (1953), cert. denied, 345 U. S. 944 (1953).
11. People v. Gowasky, 244 N. Y. 451, 460, 155 N. E. 737, 740 (1927).
